The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games

نویسندگان

  • Michael R. Baye
  • Heidrun C. Hoppe
چکیده

Conditions are identified which guarantee the strategic equivalence of rentseeking, innovation, and patent-race games. Our results permit one to apply theorems and results intended for rent-seeking games to other games, and vice versa. We conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results. (JEL Numbers: D00, L00, D72;

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 44  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2003