Gricean Quality

According to the Knowledge Account of Assertion, assertions are governed by the rule that One must: assert that p only if one knows that p. Some philosophers oppose recent arguments for the Knowledge Account by claiming that assertion, being an act much like any other, will be subject to norms governing acts generally, such as those articulated by Grice for the purpose of successful, cooperative endeavours (Sosa ; Cappelen ; Goldberg ). Because asserting is part of a social cooperative activity aimed at varying goals, and because Grice’s Cooperative Principle is a general principle meant to govern all rational social behavior (of which conversation is a subset), these philosophers suspect that Gricean resources will suffice for explaining any norm(s) relevant to assertion. In this paper I show how Grice is a traitor to their cause; or rather, they are his dissenters, not his disciples. Contrary to what they suppose, Grice thought of asserting as a special linguistic act in need of its own norm, and his discussions of the maxim of Quality point to knowledge. I develop an argument that the Quality maxim is not dependent, in the appropriate way, on the Cooperative Principle. If it is not thus dependent, then the Cooperative Principle cannot be the explanation of, or source of normativity for, the Quality maxim. Thus, not only is Grice of little help in resisting the Knowledge Account; in fact, leveraging powerful insights informing the maxim of Quality reveals new resources for a distinctive positive case that knowledge is the constitutive norm of assertion.