On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth

The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski’s theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief outlook on the “family” of theories of truth generated by the new methodology. Philosophers today are largely disillusioned with the idea of a substantive theory of truth, and the reasons are not difficult to fathom. On the one hand, the modern critics of truth have set up new, exacting standards of informativeness for substantive theories of truth (see, e.g., Field 1972); on the other hand, the modern critics have demonstrated that our current paradigm of a theory of truth, namely, Tarski’s theory, is incapable, in principle, of satisfying these standards. This incongruity, along with the persistent difficulties facing the correspondence view of truth, have led the critics to conclude that a substantive theory of truth is (either at present or in principle) unattainable. In this paper I would like to reopen the question of a substantive theory of truth and offer a new solution. My solution consists of a new methodology for substantive theories of truth, i.e., a new conception of the task, scope and structure of such theories. The proposed methodology upholds the requirements that a substantive theory of truth be highly explanatory, satisfy stringent criteria of informativeness, provide non-trivial answers to “deep” philosophical questions, etc. But it questions one of the central (if implicit) principles of the current methodology, namely: that the task of a substantive theory of truth is to delineate the one (or at least one) substantive common denominator of all truths. The feasibility of a substantive theory of truth, according to this principle, is contingent upon the existence of a substantive common denominator, but the existence of a substantive common denominator of all truths is (for reasons I will discuss below) highly problematic. My methodology for substantive theories of truth challenges this requirement. The theory of truth, on my conception, is Synthese 117: 133–172, 1999. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.