Justified Beliefs by Justified Arguments
نویسندگان
چکیده
The paper addresses how the information state of an agent relates to the arguments that the agent endorses. Information states are modeled in doxastic logic and arguments by recasting abstract argumentation theory in a modal logic format. The two perspectives are combined by an application of the theory of product logics, delivering sound and complete systems in which the interaction of arguments and beliefs is investigated.
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