Stochastic Learning of Strategic Equilibria for Auctions

نویسندگان

  • Samy Bengio
  • Yoshua Bengio
  • Jacques Robert
  • Gilles Bélanger
چکیده

This paper presents a new application of stochastic adaptive learning algorithms to the computation of strategic equilibria in auctions The proposed approach addresses the problems of tracking a moving target and balancing exploration of action space versus exploitation of better modeled regions of action space Neural networks are used to represent a stochastic decision model for each bidder Experiments con rm the correctness and usefulness of the approach

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Neural Computation

دوره 11  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 1999