Stochastic Learning of Strategic Equilibria for Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper presents a new application of stochastic adaptive learning algorithms to the computation of strategic equilibria in auctions The proposed approach addresses the problems of tracking a moving target and balancing exploration of action space versus exploitation of better modeled regions of action space Neural networks are used to represent a stochastic decision model for each bidder Experiments con rm the correctness and usefulness of the approach
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Neural Computation
دوره 11 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1999