Monotonic Sequence Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In a monotonic sequence game, two players alternately choose elements of a sequence from some fixed ordered set. The game ends when the resulting sequence contains either an ascending subsequence of length a or a descending one of length d. We investigate the behaviour of this game when played on finite linear orders or Q and provide some general observations for play on arbitrary ordered sets.
منابع مشابه
A note on the monotonicity and superadditivity of TU cooperative games∗
In this note we make a comparison between the class of monotonic TU cooperative games and the class of superadditive TU cooperative games. We first provide the equivalence between a weakening of the class of superadditive TU games and zero-monotonic TU games. Then, we show that zero-monotonic TU games and monotonic TU games are different classes. Finally, we show under which restrictions the cl...
متن کاملThe strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games
Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive equivalent criteria both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of superand submodular games. The...
متن کاملThe aggregate-monotonic core
The main objective of the paper is to study the locus of all core selection and aggregate monotonic point solutions of a TU-game: the aggregate-monotonic core. Furthermore, we characterize the class of games for which the core and the aggregate-monotonic core coincide. Finally, we introduce a new family of rules for TU-games which satisfy core selection and aggregate monotonicity.
متن کاملMonotonic -equilibria in strongly symmetric games
-equilibrium allows for worse actions to be played with higher probability than better actions. I introduce a refinement that addresses this shortcoming: an -equilibrium is monotonic if each player assigns (weakly) higher probabilities to better actions. This concept is logically independent of strong -equilibrium. I study these refinements of -equilibrium in games with countably many players a...
متن کاملDeciding Monotonic Games
In an earlier work [AČJYK00] we presented a general framework for verification of infinite-state transition systems, where the transition relation is monotonic with respect to a well quasi-ordering on the set of states. In this paper, we investigate extending the framework from the context of transition systems to that of games. We show that monotonic games are in general undecidable. We identi...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006