The Problem of Explaining Phenomenal Selfhood: A Comment on Thomas Metzinger’s Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity

Thomas Metzinger argues that phenomenal selves are appearances produced by the ongoing operations of a “self-model” that simulates, emulates, and represents aspects of the system’s states to itself – and not substantial things. In this essay, I explain the nature of phenomenal selfhood and then describe the most important problem that arises in connection with explaining phenomenal selfhood. I then argue that, by itself, the self-model theory of subjectivity lacks sufficient resources to wholly solve this problem and that Metzinger’s argument does not justify his ontological conclusions about selves. PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ PSYCHE 2005: VOLUME 11 ISSUE 5 2 In his remarkable book Being No One, Thomas Metzinger defends a representationalist and functionalist analysis of the first-person phenomenal experience of being a self. According to Metzinger, the phenomenal self – i.e., the experience of oneself as a conscious subject with a first person perspective – is no more than an appearance produced by the ongoing operations of a complicated information-processing system that simulates, emulates, and represents aspects of the system’s states to itself. Phenomenal selves are not substantial things at all on this view; while it is quite natural that we think of our selves as being real substances of some kind, selves are merely representational appearances that result from ongoing computational processes in the brain that satisfy certain conditions and produce what Metzinger terms a “self-model.” In this essay, I wish to evaluate the self-model theory of subjectivity and the strikingly nuanced and detailed analysis offered by Metzinger in support of this theory. To this end, I will begin by explaining what I take to be the nature of phenomenal selfhood; on this analysis, phenomenal selfhood is itself a pre-reflective element of every conscious experience. Next, I describe what I take to be the most important problem that arises in connection with explaining phenomenal selfhood – namely, the problem of explaining how it is that a particular phenomenal self (e.g., me) is associated with a specific set of neurophysiological processes (e.g., the processes that create a self-model in a particular living organism). I distinguish a “hard” and an “easy” issue associated with this problem. I then attempt to evaluate the self-model theory of subjectivity and argue that Metzinger’s theory falls short in a couple of important respects. First, I argue that, by itself, the self-model theory of subjectivity lacks sufficient resources to wholly ground a solution to either the hard or easy problems of phenomenal selfhood (or subjectivity). Second, I argue that Metzinger’s theory fails to justify the conclusion that the furniture of the world does not include substantial selves. None of this, however, should be construed as in any way disparaging the value or importance of this truly groundbreaking work. Although an explanation of phenomenal selfhood seems fundamental to an explanation of consciousness, philosophers of mind have devoted comparatively little space to explaining self, focusing instead on problems that presuppose it has already been explained. To my knowledge, Metzinger provides the first comprehensive attempt to articulate and solve the problems associated with explaining the self and produces an analysis that is deep, detailed, nuanced, challenging, and nearly exhaustive in scope. That Metzinger’s framework enables us to make sense of many pathological conditions which have eluded traditional theories and frameworks provides a compelling reason, on my view, to think that it will be an important part of understanding phenomenal selfhood and of solving the hard and easy problems of selfhood – even if, by itself, it cannot fully ground such solutions. But regardless of whether I am correct in thinking Metzinger’s work falls short in these respects, Metzinger’s work is the state of the art on the topic and provides a standard of excellence that few of us will ever meet. Simply put, Being No One is an outstanding philosophical achievement. PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ K. Himma: Explaining Phenomenal Selfhood 3 1. The nature of phenomenal selfhood We are conscious subjects with conscious mental states and the two seem related in a conceptually intimate way. It is hard to imagine that something could have a conscious mental state without being a conscious mental subject. The idea that there are, so to speak, free-floating mental states not instantiated by some mental subject seems conceptually incoherent: it seems clear that it is not conceptually possible for a conscious mental state to occur that is not instantiated by a mental subject. Conscious mental states or events, as a conceptual matter, happen to (or include) conscious subjects or “phenomenal selves.” I think it is also uncontroversial that we have a conscious sense of being phenomenal selves that function as mental subjects. I am always there qua phenomenal self in every conscious perception and experience that I have – and this is part of what I experience. For example, my conscious experience of a sunset includes, as partly constitutive of the experience, its happening to me qua phenomenal self. It is quite natural, then, to follow Honderich (1995) in thinking that all our conscious mental states have two parts: a “content-part” and a “subject-part.” On this characterization, being a particular phenomenal self (which is constituted by the subject-part) and having a particular content are both necessary constituents of any conscious experience. While “subject” refers to a familiar part of experience, its character and role in conscious mental states are not easy to describe. One property frequently associated with the subject-part of mental states is the property of mineness. As Metzinger aptly describes it: What justifies treating all these highly diverse kinds of ... phenomenal representational content as belong to one entity ... [is] the property of mineness. Mineness is a property of a particular form of phenomenal content that, in our own case, is introspectively accessible on the level of inner attention as well as on the level of self-directed cognition.... Here are some typical examples of how we, linguistically, refer to this particular higher-order phenomenal quantity in folk-psychological contexts: “I experience my leg subjectively as always having belonged to me” (Metzinger 2003: 302; emphasis