A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skepticism: The Empirical Case for Realism

Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance. 1. Debunking Arguments for Moral Anti-Realism 1.1. Three Skeptical Accounts of Moral Belief Can we ever know what is objectively right or wrong, good or bad? Moral realists answer yes. Anti-realists answer no: they believe that either there are no objective moral truths, or we have no knowledge of these truths. Anti-realists have often defended their position by appealing to one or another debunking explanation for moral beliefs. According to debunking explanations, our moral beliefs are chiefly or entirely produced by psychological mechanisms that are not suited to arriving at objective truths; hence, even if such truths exist, we probably don’t know them. In principle, indefinitely many kinds of debunking theories are possible. For instance, if it turned out that your moral beliefs were implanted in your mind by a capricious hypnotist, those beliefs would thereby be ‘debunked’. In practice, however, the debunking explanations seriously advanced have generally been of just three sorts. First, some hold that the moral beliefs of an individual are entirely a function of that individual’s particular emotions and desires, understood as purely non-cognitive states. Thus, David Hume states that “morality is determined by sentiment” and that “to have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character.” Second, some say that our moral beliefs are chiefly or entirely the product of our particular culture. For example, those raised in strongly Christian or Islamic communities today often judge homosexuality to be morally wrong. But if they had been born in ancient Greece, they would more likely have accepted homosexuality. Furthermore, many theorists deny that our culture reflects any objective evaluative facts; it is just the set of practices that we happen to have adopted, no better or worse, objectively speaking, than any other set of practices. Third, in recent years, evolutionary explanations of moral attitudes have grown in popularity. For example, on the assumption that our genes influence our moral beliefs 4 (perhaps indirectly, perhaps through our emotions), we can understand why most Hume 1975, p. 289; 1992, p. 471, emphasis in original. 1 See for example, Plato 1977. 2