Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
We use an interactive epistemology framework to provide a systematic analysis of some solution concepts for games with asymmetric information. We characterize solution concepts using expressible epistemic assumptions, represented as events in the canonical space generated by primitive uncertainty about the payoff relevant state, payoff irrelevant information, and actions. In most of the paper, we adopt an interim perspective, which is appropriate to analyze genuine incomplete information. We relate Delta-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, Advances in Theoretical Economics 3, 2003) to interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris, Theoretical Economics 2, 2007) and to rationalizability in the interim strategic form. We also consider the ex ante perspective, which is appropriate to analyze asymmetric information about an initial chance move. We prove the equivalence between interim correlated rationalizability and an ex ante notion of correlated rationalizability.
منابع مشابه
Cooperative Benefit and Cost Games under Fairness Concerns
Solution concepts in cooperative games are based on either cost games or benefit games. Although cost games and benefit games are strategically equivalent, that is not the case in general for solution concepts. Motivated by this important observation, a new property called invariance property with respect to benefit/cost allocation is introduced in this paper. Since such a property can be regar...
متن کاملDynamic interactive epistemology
The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive reasoning have been developed, most notably by Stalnaker [Econ. Philos. 12 (1996) 133– 163] and Batt...
متن کاملDynamic psychological games
The motivation of decision makers who care for emotions, reciprocity, or social conformity may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (Games and Economic Behavior, 1989) point out that traditional game theory is ill-equipped to address such matters, and they pioneer a new framework which does. However, their toolbox — psychological ...
متن کاملHierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games1
The epistemic analysis of solution concepts for dynamic games involves statements about the players’ beliefs conditional upon different histories of play, their conditional beliefs about each other’s conditional beliefs, etc. To represent such statements, we construct a space of infinite (coherent) hierarchies of conditional probability systems, defined with respect to a fixed collection of rel...
متن کاملDivision of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Incomplete Information
In interactive contexts such as games and economies, it is important to take account not only of what the players believe about substantive matters (such as payo s), but also of what they believe about the beliefs of other players. Two di erent but equivalent ways of dealing with this matter, the semantic and the syntactic, are set forth. Canonical and universal semantic systems are then de ned...
متن کامل