Vicious Strategies for Vickrey Auctions
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منابع مشابه
Core-Implementing Nash Equilibrium in the Vickrey Auction and Some Unstable Mechanisms
This paper demonstrates the Vickrey auction has a Nash equilibrium in the core. Generally, the dominant-strategy-equilibrium outcome of the Vickrey auction is not located in the core. However, a particular profile of truncation strategies is a Nash equilibrium, and it implements an outcome in the bidderoptimal core. The specified strategy profile is identical to that in core-selecting auctions ...
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