Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
نویسندگان
چکیده
The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to one is characterized, with examples, even when the full-dimensionality condition fails.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 61 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007