Strategic Irrationality in Extensive Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Most standard solution concepts of extensive games are history-insensitive in the sense that no matter at which information set one is, it is assumed that each player believes that everybody else is rational. In reality, each history of moves reveals certain traits of the players to one another. It is argued in this paper that solution concepts ought to make use of this fact. An example of such a concept is developed and called a ‘reasonable solution’ set. It is shown that this can explain cooperation in certain finitely-repeated games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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