Are causal facts really explanatorily emergent? Ladyman and Ross on higher-level causal facts and renormalization group explanation

In their Every Thing Must Go, Ladyman and Ross defend a novel version of NeoRussellian metaphysics of causation, which falls into three claims: (1) there are no fundamental physical causal facts (orthodox Russellian claim), (2) there are higher-level causal facts of the special sciences, and (3) higher-level causal facts are explanatorily emergent. While accepting claims (1) and (2), I attack claim (3). Ladyman and Ross argue that higher-level causal facts are explanatorily emergent, because (a) certain aspects of these higher-level facts (their universality) can be captured by renormalization group (RG) explanations, and (b) RG explanations are not reductive explanations. However, I argue that RG explanation should be understood as reductive explanations. This result undermines Ladyman and Ross’s RG-based argument for the explanatory emergence of higher-level causal facts. 1 Alexander Reutlinger, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LudwigMaximilians-Universität Munich, Ludwigstr. 31, 80539 Munich, Germany. Email: [email protected]