Delegation of Power in Normative Multiagent Systems

In this paper we reconsider the definition of counts-as relations in normative multiagent systems under the light of agent theory: counts-as relations do not directly provide an abstract interpretation of brute facts in terms of institutional facts. We argue that in many cases the inference of institutional facts from brute facts is the result of actions of agents acting on behalf of the normative systems and who are in charge of recognizing brute facts as institutional facts. We call this relation delegation of power: it is composed of a counts-as relation specifying that the effect of an action is that a fact is considered as an institutional fact and by a goal of the normative system that the fact is considered as an institutional fact. This relation is more complex than institutional empowerment, where an action of an agent counts-as an action of the normative system but no goal is involved, and than delegation of goals, where a goal is delegated to an agent without giving any power. With two case studies we show the importance of the delegation of power. Finally, we show how the new definition can be related with previous ones using different levels of abstraction.