Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Learning Dynamics in Mechanism Design: an Experimental Comparison of Public Goods Mechanisms

Nber Working Paper Series Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study

Measurement error is ubiquitous in experimental work. It leads to imperfect statistical controls, attenuated estimated effects of elicited behaviors, and biased correlations between characteristics. We develop simple statistical techniques for dealing with experimental measurement error. These techniques are applied to data from the Caltech Cohort Study, which conducts repeated incentivized sur...

Behavioral contagion during learning about another agent’s risk-preferences acts on the neural representation of decision-risk

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125; Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Melbourne, Carlton, VIC 3010, Australia; Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3052, Australia; and Computation and Neural Systems, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 9...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Aggregation and Dynamics of Survey Responses: the Case of Presidential Approval

In this paper we critique much of the empirical literature on the important political science concept of presidential approval. Much of the recent research on presidential approval has focused on the dynamic nature of approval; arguments have raged about whether presidential approval is integrated, co-integrated, or fractionally integrated. We argue that none of these time-series concepts, impo...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 on Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 a Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods

We consider a Bayesian public goods environment with independent private valuations. We fully characterize interim e cient allocation rules and prove that they correspond to decision rules based on a virtual cost-bene t criterion, together with the appropriate incentive taxes. Compared to the classical Lindahl-Samuelson solution there are generally distortions that depend on the welfare weights...