Causation and Mental Causation

مفهوم علیت در پارادایم‌های پزشکی

In this article, we aim to discuss one of the essential concepts of medicine. As a rule, such studies attempt to clarify the philosophical principals of medicine, whereby the act of medic can be regulated based on his clear perceptions of the principles of his knowledge. In this article, we will evaluate the concept of causation in medicine from a philosophical point of view and through histor...

The Experience of Mental Causation

Most of us have a very firm belief in mental causation; that is, we firmly believe that our own distinctly mental properties are causally efficacious in the production of our behavior. This belief is dominating in contemporary philosophy of mind as a part of the causal explanatory exclusion problem for non-reductive materialists. I do not discuss the exclusion problem; rather, I assess the conc...

A Ghazalian Predicament Epistemology and Metaphysics of Causation in the Works of Ghazali

Eric Marcus Mental Causation in a Physical World

It is generally accepted that the most serious threat to the possibility of mental causation is posed by the causal self-sufficiency of physical causal processes. I argue, however, that this feature of the world, which I articulate in principle I call Completeness, in fact poses no genuine threat to mental causation. Some find Completeness threatening to mental causation because they confuse it...

Pushing brains: Can Cognitive Neuroscience Provide Experimental Evidence for Brain-Mind Causation?

What makes the issue of causal relations between mental and cerebral events so special? And is there experimental evidence from neuroscience for this sort of causation? To answer these questions, the issue of brain-mind causation is considered against the background of the mind-brain problem and the theory of causation in general. Then, one empirical study from cognitive neuroscience is discuss...

Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics

In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that proce...