Persuasion by Cheap Talk
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker. We find that an expert with state-independent preferences can always make credible comparative statements that trade off the expert’s incentive to exaggerate on each dimension. Such communication benefits the expert – cheap talk is “persuasive” – if her preferences are quasiconvex. Communication benefits a decision maker by allowing for a more informed decision, but strategic interactions between multiple decision makers can reverse this gain. We apply these results to topics including product recommendations, voting, auction disclosure, and advertising. JEL: D82, L15, C72, D72, M31
منابع مشابه
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