Physicalist arguments against emergence
نویسندگان
چکیده
We should not accept standard anti-emergentist arguments that rest on assuming the correctness of physicalism. Standard strategies that are intended to block the possibility of emergent properties come at a high cost. This paper argues that they rule out a range of ways that the world could be that are, at least prima facie, scientifically acceptable prior to scientific inquiry. The paper is intended to support the view that an ontology that is amenable to the possibility of emergent properties is more open to the progress of scientific inquiry than physicalism.
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