Epistemology vs. Non-Causal Realism

This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are often missed in discussions of epistemological arguments against realism. Then I define the target of the argument — non-causal realism — and argue that any non-causal realist theory, no matter the subject matter, cannot be given a reasonable epistemology and so should be rejected. Finally I discuss and respond to several possible responses to the argument on behalf of the realist. In addition to clearing up and avoiding numerous misunderstandings of epistemological arguments of this kind that are quite common in the literature, this paper aims to present and endorse the first fully rigorous and perfectly general epistemological argument against realism.