Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms

نویسندگان

  • Martin Pál
  • Éva Tardos
چکیده

We develop a general method for cost-sharing that is approximately budget balanced and group strategyproof. We use our method to design cost sharing mechanisms for two NP-complete problems: metric facility location, and single source rent-or-buy network design. Both mechanisms are competitive, group strategyproof and recover a constant fraction of the cost. For the facility location game our costsharing method recovers a 1/3rd of the total cost, while in the network design game the cost shares pay for a 1/15 fraction of the cost of the solution. Computer Science Department, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. Email: [email protected]. Research supported in part by ONR grant N00014-98-1-0589. Computer Science Department, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. Email: [email protected]. Research supported in part by ONR grant N00014-98-1-0589.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Group-Strategyproof Mechanisms for Network Design Games via Primal-Dual Algorithms

About 15 years ago, Goemans and Williamson formally introduced the primal-dual framework for approximation algorithms and applied it to a class of network design optimization problems. Since then literally hundreds of results appeared that extended, modified and applied the technique to a wide range of optimization problems. In this paper we define a class of cost-sharing games arising from Goe...

متن کامل

Primal-dual path-following algorithms for circular programming

Circular programming problems are a new class of convex optimization problems that include second-order cone programming problems as a special case. Alizadeh and Goldfarb [Math. Program. Ser. A 95 (2003) 3-51] introduced primal-dual path-following algorithms for solving second-order cone programming problems. In this paper, we generalize their work by using the machinery of Euclidean Jordan alg...

متن کامل

Group Strategyproofness and No Subsidy via LP-Duality

We make two contributions to cooperative game theory, both of which rely heavily on linear programming duality theory. First, we introduce a fairness criterion on service providers, which we call No Subsidy. This condition ensures that a subset of the users is not overcharged in order to subsidize another set of users. We completely characterize cost functions that allow cost sharing mechanisms...

متن کامل

Approximate k-MSTs and k-Steiner Trees via the Primal-Dual Method and Lagrangean Relaxation

Garg [10] gives two approximation algorithms for the minimum-cost tree spanning k vertices in an undirected graph. Recently Jain and Vazirani [15] discovered primal-dual approximation algorithms for the metric uncapacitated facility location and k-median problems. In this paper we show how Garg’s algorithms can be explained simply with ideas introduced by Jain and Vazirani, in particular via a ...

متن کامل

The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach

The primal–dual method is a powerful algorithmic technique that has proved to be extremely useful for a wide variety of problems in the area of approximation algorithms for NP-hard problems. The method has its origins in the realm of exact algorithms, e.g., for matching and network flow. In the area of approximation algorithms, the primal–dual method has emerged as an important unifying design ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2003