On the Logic and Pragmatics of the Process of Explanation∗

In this paper, we present mainly two logical systems that clarify pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. The first concerns a proof theory that leads to the derivation of possible initial conditions from an explanandum and a given theory. The second logic concerns the derivation of questions in view of the verification of some possible initial condition, or of one out of several possible initial conditions. It is essential that the latter derivation proceeds in terms of all available knowledge, and not in terms of the explaining theory. It is shown that the second logic provides useful information for explicating further pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. Several extensions of the logics are argued to be both useful and rather easy to obtain. 1 Pragmatic Aspects of Explanation Two central themes in Matti Sintonen’s work on explanation, are (i) the urge to pay more attention to the process of explanation, rather than to its result, and (ii) the importance of pragmatic aspects of explanation. In order to understand scientific explanation, the important question is not to delineate the conditions under which a set of empirical data together with a set of theories constitute an explanation of some phenomenon, but rather to describe the way in which scientists proceed in search for an explanation of some phenomenon. Needless to say, this search is heavily laden with pragmatic aspects. We are on Sintonen’s side in this respect. We are even on his side in a further respect, which is that, nevertheless, logic is essential in the study of explanation. ∗The research for this paper was financed by the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders, and indirectly by the Flemish Minister responsible for Science and Technology (contract BIL98/37). †Joke Meheus is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders