Deciding Recognizability under Dolev-Yao Intruder Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
The importance of reasoning about recognizability has recently been stressed in finding type flaw attacks, in which a protocol message may be forged from another message. However, the problem of deciding recognizability has never been fully exploited. To fill this gap, we present a terminating procedure to decide recognizability under the standard Dolev-Yao model. By incorporating the proposed procedure with Athena, a well-know security protocol verifier, our experiments succeed in finding potential type flaw attacks.
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تاریخ انتشار 2010