Accelerating Best Response Calculation in Large Extensive Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
ion Size (# information sets) A X Y To determine our payoff at A, we need to know the distribution over the opponent being in X and Y. Recursive tree walk algorithm: PASS FORWARDS: An array of probabilities of the opponent being in each of their information sets (X and Y) RETURN: Our value at our information set, given the opponent distribution. Only visits each game state once. But in big domains (1018 in our game) this is intractable. REACH: X: 0.9 Y: 0.25 VALUE: A: $0.25 Four steps for accelerating best response computation in imperfect information games
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