The Pazner-Schmeidler Social Ordering: A Defense∗

نویسنده

  • Marc Fleurbaey
چکیده

It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of deÞning social preferences over distributions of a Þxed bundle of divisible goods. The paper follows an approach to preference aggregation which relies only on interpersonally non-comparable preferences, and circumvents Arrow’s impossibility by taking account of the shape of indifference curves. Social preferences can then be constructed and justiÞed with fairness principles. JEL ClassiÞcation: D63, D71.

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تاریخ انتشار 2001