Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
نویسندگان
چکیده
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to make iterative auctions that compute optimal allocations with myopic best-response bidding strategies more robust to manipulation. First, introduce proxy bidding agents to constrain bidding strategies to (possibly untruthful) myopic bestresponse. Second, after the auction terminates adjust the prices towards those given in the Vickrey auction, a sealedbid auction in which truth-revelation is optimal. We present an application of this methodology to iBundle, an iterative combinatorial auction which gives optimal allocations for myopic best-response agents.
منابع مشابه
ITERATIVE COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS : ACHIEVING ECONOMIC AND COMPUTATIONALEFFICIENCYDavid
ITERATIVE COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS: ACHIEVING ECONOMIC AND COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY David Christopher Parkes Supervisor: Lyle H. Ungar This thesis presents new auction-based mechanisms to coordinate systems of selfinterested and autonomous agents, and new methods to design such mechanisms and prove their optimality. Computation is increasingly carried out on open networks, with self-interested pr...
متن کاملFair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairly pricing public goods in a combinatorial auction. A well-known problem with the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is that the resulting prices may not be in the core. Loosely speaking, this means the payments of the winners could be so low, that there are losing ...
متن کاملAre Investors Credulous? Some Preliminary Evidence from Art Auctions
This paper constructs a new data set from art auctions that include auctioneer presale price estimates to examine the credulity of art investors. While auction houses typically made no price estimates before 1973, they start providing highand lowprice estimates for all artworks thereafter. Thus, we have a natural experiment to observe changes in price behavior under the influence of auctioneer ...
متن کاملOptimal Price Decremental Strategy for Dutch Auctions∗
In a Dutch auction, the price of an item decreases incrementally from the starting price at regular intervals. A bidder may buy the item at any time and stop the auction at the current price. This paper presents an optimal price decrement strategy in a Dutch auction, such that the expected revenue of the auction host is maximized. Properties of the optimal solution and a simple iterative soluti...
متن کاملSequential auctions and externalities
In many settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not necessarily implemented simultaneously. Future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players in each auction, introducing externalities. Motivated by this consideration, we study a setting of a market of buyers and sellers, where each seller holds one item, bidders have combinatorial valuations and se...
متن کامل