Semantics Embodied: Cognitive Linguistics and Searleâ•Žs Account of Linguistic Intentionality

John Searle has long argued that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind. In his view the capacity of speech acts to represent and relate to reality derives from more biologically basic forms of intentionality, such as perception and action, which initially evolved to relate organisms directly to their environments. Searle’s naturalistic model of language, in order to be complete, requires a theory of how perception and action specifically give rise to linguistic meaning and interpretation. In this paper I argue that recent theoretical developments in cognitive linguistics and the emerging field of embodied cognition provide the needed empirical support for Searle’s perception-based account of linguistic intentionality. In particular I show how the related theses of embodied simulation, perceptual symbols theory, and Arthur Glenberg’s indexical hypothesis corroborate Searle’s semantic naturalism. The result is a model in which body, mind, world, and language comprise integrated aspects of a dynamic whole. John Searle has argued that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind (1983, vii). In Searle’s view the capacity of speech acts to represent and relate to reality derives from more biologically basic forms of intentionality, such as perception and action, which initially evolved to relate organisms directly to their environments (1983, vii). Searle’s naturalistic model of language, in order to be complete, should therefore include an account of how perception and action give rise to meaning and interpretation (1969, p.17). In this article I argue that the embodied simulation hypothesis, which arose from experiments in cognitive linguistics, provides such an account and thus supports Searle’s conception of linguistic intentionality. The result is a model in which mind, world, and language are best considered as integrated aspects of a dynamic whole. Res Cogitans (2014) 5 Flores | 41 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans Intentionality-with-a-t vs. Intensionality-with-an-s In order to begin my account it is important that I first clarify some potentially confusing terms often encountered in the philosophy of language: the distinction between Intentionality and Intensionality. Searle makes the distinction as follows: Intentionality-with-a-t is that feature of the mind whereby it is “about” “directed-at” or “of ” objects or states of affairs in the world; Intentionality-with-an-s is a property of sentences whereby they fail certain tests for extensionality, such as Leibniz’s law which asserts that equals may be substituted for equals in a truth preserving manner (Searle, 1983 p. 24). Reports of intentional-with-a-t states are typically intensionalwith-an-s sentences. Examples help to illustrate this distinction: Mathematical statements are purely extensional—meaning that equals may always be substituted for equals salva veritate e.g., 2 + 2 =4 has the same truth value as 2 + 2 = 8/2 because 8/2 and 4 are equivalent. Reports of knowledge contexts, however, often fail such tests for extensionality, as do sentences which report intentional-with-a-t states such as beliefs and desires. Example: if we take the true sentence which reports an intentional state such as: “John knows the morning star is the planet Venus,” and substitute into it the extensionally equivalent term: “the evening star,” we end up with the false sentence: “John knows the evening star is the planet Venus,” because as it happens, John is unaware of that particular astronomical fact. In such situations as above where the substitutability of co-referring terms fails to preserve truth, we say the sentence and context are intensional (with-an-s). Of direct import to the present conversation is the difference between what a term designates and what it means. This dichotomy has appeared in the philosophy of language under many guises, in John Stuart Mill as “connotation” and “denotation,” in Frege as: “Sinn” and “Bedeutung,” and finally in Carnap as “intension” and “extension.” The two phrases, “morning star” and “evening star” denote the same object—the planet Venus—but they do not have the same meaning. They have the same extensions but different intensions. Meaning, Inside and Out Much of analytic philosophy has been occupied with giving an account of meaning in terms of extension i.e, as reference or truth conditions. The account I am here presenting is different in that it approaches meaning primarily as intension rather than extension. To put things simply: what a term means is its intension and what it refers to or denotes is its extension. This makes Searle’s account a primarily internalist one, which is to say that what it is that gives a symbol its meaning is chiefly something ‘in one’s head’. What exactly is in one’s head, I will soon argue, is an embodied simulation. Searle has been one of a few remaining defenders of semantic internalism. Res Cogitans (2014) 5 Flores | 42 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans On his account it is in virtue of internal features of an intentional or perceptual state which determine its conditions of satisfaction. The mind sets the conditions by which an intention or perception ‘counts’ as fulfilling its function. There are, however, many external factors involved both in Searle’s ‘internalism’ and on an embodied cognitive account, a point which will be important later. The external factors may be seen to come into play in Searle’s assertion that the intentionality of perceptual states refers essentially to the external world e.g., part of the conditions of satisfaction of a visual experience is that the experience itself must be caused by what is seen (1983 p.49). Such contents do not achieve their conditions of satisfaction or directions of fit atomistically, but only against a background of capacities, ‘know-how,’ and habits as well as a network of other intentional states— beliefs, desires and assumptions about the world. How a term or symbol becomes meaningful for a particular person is an aspect of Searle’s account which remains underelaborated and is where, I will argue, theories of embodied simulation provide a means for filling gaps in Searle’s account. Searle’s Account of Linguistic Intentionality Searle has expended much effort arguing that language and meaning should be seen as part of the natural physical and biological world—as natural as digestion or mitosis (Searle, 1979). He states that a large part of his philosophy is an attempt to provide a naturalistic account of how we, as a species, get from the physics of producing noises and writing to the semantics of speech acts (Searle, 1983 p. 161). For Searle the derived intentionality of marks, gestures, and noises is parasitic upon the intrinsic intentionality of the mind (1969 p.16). Speaker meaning, according to Searle, results from the imposition of the same conditions of satisfaction of one’s intentional state upon a physical action used to express that state. If I believe that it is raining, the conditions of satisfaction of that state are truth conditions, viz. that it in fact be raining. A successful assertion of that fact consists of my imposing those truth conditions upon the noises I employ to make the assertion, and is thus how I ‘mean’ it is raining when I say the English sentence “it is raining.” Searle’s theory of meaning is then closely tied to his theories of intentional action and perception (1969 p.17). The perceptual grounding of conceptual structure is also a key tenet of embodied cognitive science (Talmy, 1995). In the embodied view language comprehension is seen as a function of an embodied organism directly coupled to, and in continuous interaction with, its physical and social environment.