On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
نویسنده
چکیده
A sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem, i.e. two-sided one-to-one matching with non transferable utility. For small economies this condition is also necessary. This class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
A note on the uniqueness of stable marriage matching
In this note we present some sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a stable matching in the Gale-Shapley marriage classical model of even size. We also state the result on the existence of exactly two stable matchings in the marriage problem of odd size with the same conditions.
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