BELIEF-FREE EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION BY JOHANNES HÖRNER and STEFANO LOVO COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1286 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
نویسندگان
چکیده
We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations.
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