Does Executive Portfolio Structure Affect Risk Management? CEO Risk- taking Incentives and Corporate Derivatives Usage

نویسنده

  • Daniel A. Rogers
چکیده

This paper extends the investigation of the effect of managerial motives on hedging policy. I utilize a proxy variable that incorporates CEO incentives to increase risk relative to incentives to increase stock price. The variable is directly measured using observed characteristics of CEO portfolios of stock and option holdings. Furthermore, CEO risk-taking incentives are modeled as a choice variable to eliminate the simultaneity bias of modeling risk-taking incentives as an exogenous variable. If modeled as a simultaneous system of equations, a strong negative link between CEO risk-taking incentives and the amount of derivative holdings exists. This result is consistent with the notion that derivatives are used for hedging purposes. Both the characteristics of stock and option holdings are important in determining cross-sectional differences in corporate derivative holdings. JEL classification: G13, G34, G39, J33

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

CEO Risk-Taking Incentives based on Environmental Sustainability

In this study, I try to examine the effect of environmental sustainability on CEO risk taking. Prior research, however, has struggled to establish this relation empirically; moreover, some evidence points to the possibility that the CEO risk appetite is lower for firms with sustainable environment. The opportunistic approach of managers leads to decisions about personal interests and imposing c...

متن کامل

Board Compensation and Risk-Taking: The Moderating Role of CEO Duality (Evidence from Banking Industry)

  The purpose of this paper is to explore relationship between board compensation and risk taking with regard to CEO duality in the banking industry. Using a panel data regression model, with regard to optimal contracting and managerial power theory, we examined the data to determine the relationship between board compensation and risk taking of twenty one banks, for the period 2012 to 2018. R...

متن کامل

Derivatives Hedging, Risk Appetite, and Managerial Compensation Incentives in U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Companies

We examine the relationship between derivatives hedging, risk-taking, and managerial compensation incentives from an enterprise risk management perspective in U.S. publicly traded property-liability insurance companies. We find that derivatives usage is negatively related to various risks, supporting the stabilizing effect of derivatives use for hedging purposes. Our evidence also shows that de...

متن کامل

Working Papers in Responsible Banking & Finance Does Corporate Culture Affect Bank Risk - Taking ? Evidence from Loan - Level Data

Using comprehensive corporate and retail loan data, we show that the corporate culture of banks explains their risktaking behaviour. Banks whose corporate culture leans towards aggressive competition are associated with riskier lending practices: higher approval rate, lower borrower quality, and fewer covenant requirements. Consequently, these banks incur larger loan losses and make greater con...

متن کامل

Examining the effect of CEO ower confidence on banks risk taking using the Generalized Method of Moments(GMM)

The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of CEO Overconfidence on banks Risk Taking using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of banks in Tehran Stock. These Three dimensions Corporate Risk Taking in our tests :( Total Risk, Idiosyncratic Risk and Systematic Risk). For this purpose one hypotheses are developed and data on the 16 Bank in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1390...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2000