Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) establishes a multilateral framework for the liberalization of international trade in goods. Under the auspices of GATT, signatories have reduced tariffs affecting hundreds of billions of dollars in trade annually.1 GATT also constrains the use of quotas and other quantitative restrictions on imports and exports,2 the use of internal tax and regulatory policies to favor domestic over foreign producers,3 and a variety of other protectionist devices. Because of the extensive GATT restrictions on government interference with international markets, it is tempting to view the Agreement as a high-minded, trade-liberalizing undertaking, devoted to the pursuit of free trade and to the defeat of protectionist forces. But scholars have long argued that such a view of GATT is naive, and that it must instead be understood as an expedient bargain among the self-interested political leaders of GATT signatories. 4 Although GATT can largely be justified by sound arguments about the public interest in a liberal trading order, it is best understood with the aid of public choice theory. The subject of this Article is a particular GATT provision that is indeed difficult to comprehend without the public choice perspective-Article XIX, which allows signatories to renege upon their commitments to reduce trade barriers. More precisely, Article