Economic Recommendation Systems

In the on-line Explore & Exploit literature, central to Machine Learning, a central planner is faced with a set of alternatives, each yielding some unknown reward. The planner’s goal is to learn the optimal alternative as soon as possible, via experimentation. A typical assumption in this model is that the planner has full control over the experiment design and implementation. When experiments are implemented by a society of self-motivated agents the planner can only recommend experimentation but has no power to enforce it. Kremer et. al. [9] introduce the first study of explore and exploit schemes that account for agents’ incentives. In their model it is implicitly assumed that agents do not see nor communicate with each other. Their main result is a characterization of an optimal explore and exploit scheme. In this work we extend [9] by adding a layer of a social network according to which agents can observe each other. It turns out that when observability is factored in the scheme proposed by Kremer et. al. is no longer incentive compatible. In our main result we provide a tight bound on how many other agents can each agent observe and still have an incentive-compatible algorithm and asymptotically optimal outcome. More technically, for a setting with N agents where the number of nodes with degree greater than N is bounded by N and 2α+ β < 1 we construct incentive-compatible asymptotically optimal mechanism. The bound 2α+ β < 1 is shown to be tight.