Contracting for Information (Preliminary and Incomplete)∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study optimal contracts between a decision maker and an expert where the decision maker can commit to make transfers to the expert contingent on his advice but cannot commit to take an action contingent on advice. We show that optimal contracts never entail full revelation. Instead, the decision maker pays the expert to reveal for some states and doesn’t compensate the expert at all in others. ∗Please do not quote without permission from the authors. Comments greatly appreciated.
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