Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities
نویسندگان
چکیده
In addition to useful Economic interpretation, auction based algorithms are generally found to be efficient. In this note, we observe that the auction-based mechanism can also be used to efficiently compute market equilibrium for a large class of utility functions satisfying gross substitutability, including a range of CES (constant elasticity of substitution) and Cobb-Douglas functions.
منابع مشابه
Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium
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