Coalitional Nash Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
Let G be an N -player game in strategic form and C be a set of permissible coalition of players (exogenously given). A strategy profile σ is a coalitional-equilibrium if no permissible coalition in C has a unilateral deviation that profits to all its members. At the two extremes: when C contains only singleton players, σ reduces to a Nash equilibrium and when C consists on all coalitions of players, σ is a strong Nash equilibrium. Our paper provides conditions for existence of coalitional equilibria that combine quasi-concavity and balancedness. JEL classification: C62, C72.
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