Conscious and Unconscious Processes in Human Desire

Elaborated Intrusion theory (Kavanagh, Andrade & May 2005) distinguishes between unconscious, associative processes as the precursors of desire, and controlled processes of cognitive elaboration that lead to conscious sensory images of the target of desire and associated affect. We argue that these mental images play a key role in motivating human behavior. Consciousness is functional in that it allows competing goals to be compared and evaluated. The role of effortful cognitive processes in desire helps to explain the different time courses of craving and physiological withdrawal. Jackie Andrade Jon May University of Plymouth, UK School of Psychology, David Kavanagh Queensland University of Technology Institute of Health & Biomedical Innovation We define desire as a conscious state, distinguishing it from underlying neural mechanisms of reward and from physiological drug withdrawal symptoms. Desire is a complex mixture of images, thoughts, and expectations combined with positive and negative emotions. It is a felt need or want, a “subjectively experienced motivational state, which fluctuates over time” (Field, Munafò & Franken, in press). We contend that all desires include both pleasure, which comes from thinking about the target of desire, and distress from the absence of the target. The balance of positive and negative feelings varies, from the mainly pleasurable anticipation of satisfaction on entering a restaurant when hungry, to the agonizing craving in the face of prolonged deficit when a person with high physical dependence stops using an addictive drug. Although the term “craving” is usually reserved for intense urges in addictions, the phenomenology of cravings and desires is similar across a range of addictive and everyday substances and activities, from smoking tobacco and drinking alcohol to eating food and playing sport (e.g., May, Andrade, Kavanagh & Penfound, 2008). We therefore use the term “desire” to refer to desires for addictive drugs as well as more mundane wants, reserving “craving” for discussing findings emanating specifically from the literature on drug addiction. 1 Contact details: Professor Jackie Andrade, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth PL4 8AA, UK. Email [email protected], Tel +44 1752 584807 2 Institute of Health & Biomedical Innovation, and School of Psychology and Counselling, Queensland University of Technology, Australia We argue that the precursors of desire are usually unconscious. Self-report data show that people rarely have insight into the negative moods, physiological changes, or environmental stimuli that trigger their desires (May, Andrade, Panabokke & Kavanagh, 2004). Desire itself involves conscious cognition and felt emotions. In this paper we present the Elaborated Intrusion theory of desire (EI theory; Kavanagh, Andrade & May, 2005; May et al., 2004), which explains the different roles of conscious and unconscious cognitive and emotional processes in desire. We argue that distinguishing between conscious and unconscious processes allows us to explain several important features of desire: its role as a motivator of behavior, its temporal dynamics, and its vulnerability to interference. Existing models of desire explain how drug addiction involves changes in the brain’s reward pathways, such that drug cues become more rewarding and more noticeable (Franken, 2003; Robinson & Berridge, 1993). They explain how learned associations between specific environments and the effects of drugs or drug withdrawal can trigger craving (e.g., Stewart, de Wit, & Eikelboom, 1984; Wikler, 1973). They also explain how people’s expectations about drug effects and confidence in their self-control determine whether they act out their desires (e.g., Bandura, 1999). These models explain some important features of craving and addiction, including the fact that people find it easier to quit addictions in novel environments, which they have not previously associated with drug use (Robins, Helzer & Davis, 1975) and the fact that cravings increase as addictions progress, even though addicts report liking the drug less (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). None of the theories explains well the variability of desire depending on competing cognitive tasks or the relative independence of desire and physiological withdrawal symptoms. Desire for drugs can lessen while physiological symptoms increase, for instance in the first few days after stopping smoking (Shiffman et al., 1997), and remain high after physiological symptoms have normalized (Nava, Caldiroli, Premi, & Lucchini, 2006). Ex-smokers can report a sudden return of cravings for cigarettes months or years after quitting. The same level of physiological hunger can lead to a strong desire to eat while we are engaged in a dull task but pass unnoticed if we are taking a test or giving a talk. Elaborated Intrusion theory EI theory (Kavanagh et al., 2005; May et al., 2004) maps out the cognitive and emotional processes active during desire. It gives a key role in desire to mental imagery, the maintenance in consciousness of sensory representations with affective content. Imagery is closely linked with emotion (Holmes, Geddes, Colom & Goodwin, 2008; Holmes & Mathews, 2005): We imagine tragedy and we feel sad, we bring to mind a happy memory and we feel that happiness again. We imagine unwrapping a bar of chocolate and feel the anticipated pleasure of eating it. It is the importance given to imagery that particularly distinguishes EI theory from the other major cognitive theory of desire (Tiffany 1990). In Tiffany’s theory, desire is what we feel when we exert cognitive effort to inhibit habitual drug-use behaviors, such as taking a cigarette out of a packet and lighting it. It is an epiphenomenon, whereas in EI theory, desire is a determinant of behavior because it is the means by which we hold emotionally-charged goals in consciousness. EI theory distinguishes between unconscious, associative processes and controlled processes of cognitive elaboration (Figure 1). Episodes of desire are triggered by a range of environmental, physiological or cognitive cues that increase the likelihood of thoughts about the desired activity breaking into consciousness. Desire is the state that pertains when such thoughts are elaborated, that is, when they lead to ruminations about how to achieve the desire or how to inhibit it, and, importantly, to the construction of conscious, sensory images. People Conscious and unconscious processes in human desire 85 imagine smoking a cigarette and the pleasure or relief that it will give them, or they imagine playing sport and the pleasure of running fast, winning a competition, et cetera (e.g. May et al., 2008). Desire images are an example of “hot cognition”; they have affective content. We feel pleasure or relief when we imagine consummating our desires. Because the images simulate the desired activity, they are immediately pleasurable. In the longer term, however, they enhance awareness of deficit, the realization that we are trying to quit smoking or have to wait until tomorrow’s sporting fixture. This pleasurable imagery and enhanced awareness of deficit lead to a downward spiral of increasingly vivid imagery of the desired activity and worsening mood. The desire becomes stronger as more vivid, briefly pleasurable images are generated in an attempt to rectify the negative mood that they ultimately provoke. Empirical Support for Unconscious and Conscious Processes in Desire Self-report data support the distinction between unconscious precursors of craving and conscious imagery, showing that people lack insight into the causes of their craving and experience the start of their craving as an intrusive thought, for example “I’m hungry”, “I need a cigarette” (May et al., 2008). Even in an addicted sample, these thoughts often vanish without being elaborated (Kavanagh et al., 2009). Experimental evidence shows that abstinence leads to faster responses to desire-related words relative to neutral words. We found that hungry participants responded more quickly to food-related words (e.g., lunch, crisps) than to transport-related words (e.g., taxi, jet), and that this speeding of response to food words corresponded to the higher incidence of intrusive thoughts about food in hungry, rather than satiated, participants (Berry, Andrade & May, 2007). This evidence supports the assumed relationship between intrusive thoughts and unconscious precursors that increase availability of desire-related information. Figure 1. The Elaborated Intrusion theory of desire. The central square box represents desire, rounded external boxes the antecedents of desire. Thick arrows show the controlled processing cycle of conscious imagery and associated affect; thin arrows represent unconscious influences on desire (reprinted from Kavanagh et al., 2005,