How a prototype argues

In this article, we argue that, just as an edition of a book can be a means of reifying a theory about how books should be edited, so can the creation of an experimental digital prototype be understood as conveying an argument about designing interfaces. Building on this premise, we explore theoretical affinities shared by recent design and book history scholarship, and connect those theories to the emerging practice of peer-reviewing digital objects in scholarly contexts. We suggest a checklist for subjecting prototypes directly to peer review: Is the argument reified by the prototype contestable, defensible, and substantive? Does the prototype have a recognizable position in the context of similar work, either in terms of concept or affordances? Is the prototype part of a series of prototypes with an identifiable trajectory? Does the prototype address possible objections? Is the prototype itself an original contribution to knowledge? We also outline some implications for funding agencies interested in supporting researchers who are designing experimental computer prototypes. For instance, if a series of prototypes functions as a set of smaller arguments within a larger debate, it might be more appropriate to fund the sequence rather than treating each project as an individual proposal. ................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Prototypes as theories It makes a difference whether we think in terms of processes or of products. The differences between computer and computing, or model and modelling, are more than grammatical. As Willard McCarty asserts, the participle ‘turns things into algorithmic performances’ (2008, p. 254), and signals intellectual processes whose full complexity cannot be contained within single artifacts. It thus enriches our vocabulary far more to speak of computing than of the computer. That principle also helps explain the widespread takeup of John Unsworth’s idea of scholarly primitives—discovering, annotating, comparing, and so on—which he expressed not as nouns but as participles, implying communities of practice based on performable actions, not just shared products (Unsworth, 2000). Our intention is to extend this logic of process to terms like designing and prototyping, both of which name activities at the core of the digital humanities. We approach this issue by exploring how the often Correspondence: