Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Online Labor Markets

نویسندگان

  • Yili Hong
  • Chong Wang
  • Paul A. Pavlou
چکیده

O labor markets are Web-based platforms that enable buyers to identify and contract for information technology (IT) services with service providers using buyer-determined (BD) auctions. BD auctions in online labor markets either follow an open or a sealed bid format. We compare open and sealed bid auctions in online labor markets to identify which format is superior in terms of obtaining more bids and a higher buyer surplus. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the relative advantage of open versus sealed bid auctions hinges on the role of reducing service providers’ valuation uncertainty (difficulty in assessing the cost to execute a project) and competition uncertainty (difficulty in assessing the intensity of the competition from other service providers), which largely depend on the relative importance of the common value (versus the private value) component of the auctioned IT services, calling for an empirical investigation to compare open and sealed bid auctions. Based on a unique data set of 71,437 open bid auctions and 7,499 sealed bid auctions posted by 21,799 buyers at a leading online labor market, we find that, on average, although sealed bid auctions attract 18.4% more bids, open bid auctions offer buyers $10.87 higher surplus. Furthermore, open bid auctions are 55.3% more likely to result in a buyer’s selection of a certain service provider and 22.1% more likely to reach a contract (conditional on the buyer’s making a selection) with a provider, and they generate higher buyer satisfaction. In contrast to conventional wisdom that “the more bids the better” and industry practice of treating sealed bid auctions as a premium feature, our results suggest that the buyer surplus gained from the reduction in valuation uncertainty enabled by open bid auctions outweighs the buyer surplus gained from the higher competition uncertainty in sealed bid auctions, which renders open bid auctions a superior auction design in online labor markets.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

“Make a Desert and Call it Peace”: The March of Online Reverse Auctions in Business Markets

This paper explores the effects of online reverse auctions (ORAs) in business markets using an illustrative case study of the introduction of this tool in relationships involving a car assembler and three of its suppliers. In an online reverse auction, a buyer defines the terms of the exchange and sellers bid to push the prices down either through open or sealed bid formats. The feasibility of ...

متن کامل

Modeling online auctions with proxy-bidding: Ascending versus Sealed Model

This paper presents several empirical tests of the hypothesis that eBay bidders bid “as if” they are in a sealed bid auction. The tests rely on observations of the magnitudes and timing of top two proxy bids. We apply the tests to data from three eBay markets MP3 players, DVDs and Chevrolet Corvettes. All tests reject the sealed-bid model in all three datasets, and a significant portion of auct...

متن کامل

Tests of the sealed-bid abstraction in online auctions

This paper presents five empirical tests of the popular modeling abstraction that bidders in ascending online auctions bid “as if” they were in a sealed bid auction. The tests rely on observations of the magnitudes and timings of top two proxy bids, with the different tests stemming from different regularity assumptions about the underlying joint distribution of signals and timings. We apply th...

متن کامل

Cost and Trust Issues in On-Line Auctions

Many auction mechanisms, including rst and second-price ascending and sealed-bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of di erent mechanisms for on-line auctions, focusing on the di erent costs of determining reservation prices, determining bids and communicating bids, and on whether the auctioneer is trusted. Di erent auction formats ...

متن کامل

A Laboratory Investigation of Rank Feedback in Procurement Auctions

A procurement auction format is one in which bidders compete during a live auction event but observe only the rank of their own bid and not the price bids of their competitors. We investigate the performance of auctions with rank feedback in a simple setting for which analytical benchmarks are readily available. We test these benchmarks in the laboratory by comparing the performance of auctions...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Information Systems Research

دوره 27  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2016