Core and Bargaining Set of Shortest Path Games
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of DavisMaschler and Zhou coincide in a class of shortest path games
منابع مشابه
Cost allocation in shortest path games
A class of cooperative games arising from shortest path problems is deened. These shortest path games are shown to be totally balanced and allow a population-monotonic allocation scheme. Possible methods for obtaining core elements are indicated; rst, by relating to the allocation rules in taxation and bankruptcy problems, second, by constructing an explicit rule that takes opportunity costs in...
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