Labor Law In Great Britain And France In the 1980’s: The Unintended Effects Of Legal Reforms On Organized Labor

This paper compares two instances where the political use of law, specifically labor legislation, was used to effect broader social change during the early 1980s. The two cases focused on are the Thatcher administration in Great Britain and the Mitter and government in France. These divergent cases are instructive as much for their similarities as for their differences. Though the two governments had opposite intentions in terms of the role that organized labor would play in their respective societies, each relied on extensive labor law reform as a means to achieve their objectives. The eventual outcomes of these two political experiments were also similar: power of organized labor was undermined in both countries, albeit in the one case intentionally and in the other unintentionally. Overall this comparison provides insight into the problematic nature of state projects, particularly when law is used to achieve specific social and political aims. Nash, Bradley (2004) "Labor Law In Great Britain And France In the 1980’s: The Unintended Effects Of Legal Reforms On Organized Labor" Michigan Sociological Review vol.18 pp.166-190 Version of Record Available @ (http://www.jstor.org/stable/40969098) LABOR LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE 1980S: THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF LEGAL REFORMS ON ORGANIZED LABOR Bradley Nash Appalachian State University Abstract Thispaper compares two instances where the political use of law, specifically labor legislation, was used to effect broader social change during the early 1980s. The two cases focused on are the Thatcher administration in Great Britain and the Mitter and government in France. These divergent cases are instructive as much for their similarities as for their differences. Though the two governments had opposite intentions in terms of the role that organized labor wouldThispaper compares two instances where the political use of law, specifically labor legislation, was used to effect broader social change during the early 1980s. The two cases focused on are the Thatcher administration in Great Britain and the Mitter and government in France. These divergent cases are instructive as much for their similarities as for their differences. Though the two governments had opposite intentions in terms of the role that organized labor would play in their respective societies, each relied on extensive labor law reform as a means to achieve their objectives. The eventual outcomes of these two political experiments were also similar: power of organized labor was undermined in both countries, albeit in the one case intentionally and in the other unintentionally. Overall this comparison provides insight into the problematic nature of state projects, particularly when law is used to achieve specific social and political aims. INTRODUCTION Comparative research on postwar industrial relations in North America and Western Europe usually converges on a singular narrative of historical development. The tale typically goes as follows. After World War II many Western nations tentatively established what have been labeled as "postwar settlements" (Altvater et al, 1986) or "labor accords" (Edwards and Podgursky, 1986). Though their specific character varied widely across national boundaries, these institutional arrangements commonly entailed collaborative mechanisms allowing leading representatives of labor, capital, and the state to work in concert as they strove to rationalize and stabilize the frequently tumultuous arena of industrial affairs. Embedded within and ultimately dependent upon a broader context of robust economic growth, these settlements were however destined to a precarious existence. Not surprisingly, when the space for political and economic compromise was reduced by the crises of the early 1970s, great strain was put on the labor accords as well (Krieger, 1986:22-38). As this familiar story continues, political experimentation with alternative industrial relations policies thus became a pressing requirement for many capitalist democracies during the 1970s and early 1980s. Government leaders typically followed one of two divergent paths as they tried to restore economic growth and industrial stability to their respective nations. A corporatist tack was pursued by some, which relied on extending the state's role in economic coordination and further institutionalized postwar Keynesian practices. A neo-liberal course was followed by others, which involved a political retreat from industrial relations management and a greater reliance on market discipline (Jessop et al, 1986:8-9). Regardless of the particular path chosen, state-driven transformations of industrial relations during this era were usually multifaceted endeavors entailing variable arrays of policy initiatives and differing levels of reform. Indeed, while some state projects entailed piecemeal attempts at either buttressing or dismantling what remained of the institutional frameworks of the original postwar settlements, others tried to fundamentally restructure national industrial relations systems as a whole. It is state ventures of the latter type that are the subject of this paper. Specifically, my primary focus is on the extensive labor law reforms implemented in Great Britain and France during the early 1980s. I feel comparing these two historical cases is instructive not only for their differences but also for their similarities. In terms of differences, the two governments had opposite intentions with respect to the role they saw organized labor playing in their respective national political economies. The neo-liberalist Thatcher administration hoped to significantly diminish, if not entirely eliminate, the influence of labor unions in Great Britain, while Mitterrand's socialist government tried to enhance the position of labor unions as it moved France further in a corporatist direction. Despite contrary goals, however, political actors in both countries relied on sweeping changes in labor law as a primary means to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, the outcomes of these two political experiments were also remarkably alike, with the power of organized labor being undermined in both countries; though in the one case this indicated success and in the other it signaled