Perspectives on Character

Part I: Character in Ethics (1) Mariska Leunissen (UNC-Chapel Hill): “Aristotle on the Person-Situation Debate: The Fragility of Natural Character” Studies of Aristotle’s conception of character traditionally focus on his ethical works (Annas, 1993; Nussbaum, 1986; and Sherman, 1989). In this context, character is discussed mainly in its role as the bearer of morality: it is a virtuous state of character that disposes one to perform actions that hit the mean and that are therefore praiseworthy. Aristotle emphasizes that these states of character – and not just our actions – are ‘up to us and voluntary’ (see, e.g., NE III 5, 1114a4-31 and b28-9). Provided that we receive the appropriate moral education from childhood and are raised in a properly organized city, we can shape our character by performing right and just actions. The moral character that results from this kind of habituation is stable across time and robust across situations, and therefore reliably predicts and guides virtuous actions. It is this ‘global’, ‘personality’ view of character that has continued to inspire virtue-ethicists and moral psychologists to the present day, but which – more recently – also has attracted considerable criticism as being unempirical and as taking insufficiently into account how much our behavior is influenced by situational factors (see Doris 2002, especially 1-27; Merritt, 2000: 365-366; and Merritt, Doris & Harman, 2010: 356-360). In this paper, I will argue that Aristotle’s mostly neglected biological views about ‘natural’ (as opposed to ‘moral’) character offer a third, alternative view of character that accommodates the personality perspective about the importance of traits in explaining our actions but also the situationist thesis about the influence of our environment. For, in his biological works, Aristotle defines character as a natural capacity of the soul that predisposes an animal’s – non-moral – feelings or actions related to survival and procreation. And while these natural character traits reliably predict and guide all kinds of behaviors, Aristotle believes that those traits themselves are determined by the organism’s physiological make-up or what he calls its ‘material nature’ and that they are easily changed by external efficient causes that are not up to that organism, such as climate, aging, and disease. In other words, although Aristotle never denies that the shaping of our moral character is ‘up to us’ or that character – whether moral or natural – guides our actions, his biological views indicate that natural character traits are not robust, but highly local and (sometimes literally) situation specific. After a consideration of the biological evidence concerning Aristotle’s views about character, I conclude by laying out some ethical consequences of these views, especially with regard to the extent to which one’s natural character matters for moral development. (2) Thomas Hill (UNC-Chapel Hill) & Adam Cureton (University of Tennessee, Knoxville): “Principle and Character in Kant’s Ethics” This essay will explore the role of character in Kant’s ethical theory. Recent progress has been made correcting misconceptions about the role of virtue in Kant and highlighting aspects of his view that are amenable to virtue ethicists. But some have gone too far in making Kant into a virtue ethicist who leaves deontology behind. We will explain the prominent and complicated role of rules and principles at various stages in Kant’s theory and emphasize, within this framework, distinctive and appealing aspects of Kant’s conception of virtue as compared to Aristotelian accounts. For example, Kant is opposed to moral luck, he endorses personal prerogatives to pursue our own projects, he offers greater unity and structure to morality, and offers an interesting account of moral education and development. (3) Ben Bradley (Syracuse University): “Character and Consequences” What role does virtue play in moral theory? Many answers to this question have been proposed: some think that a right act is what a virtuous person would characteristically do; some think that virtue is intrinsically good; some think that virtue is a constituent of well-being; and some think that virtue is a basis for desert of well-being. The truth of any of these suggestions, however, depends on what virtue actually is. On one plausible account of virtue, virtues are character traits that have good consequences, and vices are character traits that have bad consequences. This is virtue consequentialism. Versions of this view can be found in the work of Driver, Foot, and Hursthouse. Virtue consequentialism is not only prima facie plausible, it also promises to explain some features of virtue that trip up other theories – for example, how it can be that a character trait (such as chastity) can be a virtue at one time but not at a later time. What I would like to do here is argue that if virtue consequentialism in its best version is true, we have a reason to doubt all of the above claims regarding the role of virtue in moral theory. I will begin by suggesting that the best version of a consequentialist theory of virtue is contrastivism about virtue. On a contrastivist view, virtue is a character trait that makes a positive difference to the world – which involves a comparison between how the world is when people have that character trait and how it would be if they didn’t. But there are many ways to lack a character trait. So there is no absolute fact of the matter concerning how instrumentally good some character trait is, and no such thing as a virtue simpliciter; rather, the fundamental virtue facts are of the form it is a virtue (i.e. it is instrumentally good) to have character trait C1 rather than C2. If contrastivism about virtue thus understood is true, virtue is neither essentially linked to rightness as frequently supposed, nor intrinsically good, nor is it an adequate basis for either well-being or desert. (4) Kate Abramson (Indiana University): “On the Complexity of Humean Character” In everyday life, we sometimes condemn people tempted to bad behavior, even if they don’t act on those temptations. For instance, we will be relieved if a person who feels tempted to act out of prejudice refrains from doing so. But it is a mark of bad character to feel drawn to bigoted conduct in the first place. We hold it against such folks, partly because we expect that one can over time come not to even be tempted to act in such appalling ways. To make sense of this aspect of our moral practices, I contend, one must hold that a virtuous agent’s moral commitments can play a very particular kind of practical role in her character. It must be possible, I argue, for an agent’s moral commitments to alter the very structure of an agent’s desires and passions in specific ways, and to inform the place of those desires within her larger motivational psychology. Hume’s conception of character and of morality’s practical influence upon it is complex in just this way. But to see this, I argue, we need to pay attention not only to Hume's writings on ethics in his Treatise and Enquiries, but also the rather more neglected Essays. (5) Mark Alfano (Princeton University & University of Oregon): “How One Becomes What One Is: The Case for a Nietzschean Conception of Character Development” I argue that Nietzsche’s conception of character development is the most empirically adequate of any historical view. Character trait attributions – whether they target oneself or others – tend to function as self-fulfilling prophecies. The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 1, I sketch the Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian conceptions of character development. For Aristotle, one becomes virtuous through habituation and the cultivation of practical wisdom. According to Hume, one becomes virtuous through the joint influences of sympathy, (dis)approbation, and natural development. The Kantian view has two levels. At the noumenal level, one becomes virtuous by choosing a universalizable supreme maxim over self-love; at the phenomenal level, this choice is manifested as a disposition to do one’s duty, even and especially when it conflicts with narrow self-interest. As I spell out in more detail in section 3, none of these theories enjoys as much empirical support as the Nietzschean conception of character. In section 2, I lay out the Nietzschean conception of character development, which is aptly condensed in the formula, “how one becomes what one is.” A crucial feature of this view is that the dispositions a person ends up with are the ones that she is taken to have – either by herself, if she exhibits an active, masterly, creative tendency, or by others, if she exhibits a reactive, slavish, mimetic tendency. Someone who thinks she is honest will tend to behave in honest ways; someone whom others consider dishonest will tend to behave in dishonest ways. This view can be found throughout Nietzsche’s writings, but especially in Human, All Too Human 51 (“If someone obstinately and for a long time wants to appear something it is in the end hard for him to be anything else”), The Gay Science 58 (“The reputation, name, and appearance [...] of a thing [...] nearly always becomes its essence and effectively acts as its essence”), and throughout the first essay of The Genealogy of Morals. In section 3, I argue that the Nietzschean view is the best empirically supported conception of character. The basis for this argument is my own theory of factitious virtue, which I develop in Character as Moral Fiction (Cambridge UP 2013) and elsewhere. On this view, character trait attributions tend to function as self-fulfilling prophecies through the mechanisms of self-concept and social expectations. (6) David Wolfsdorf (Temple University): “On Character and Moral Character” The phrase "aretê êthikê" expresses one of the central concepts in Aristotle's ethical writings. It is often rendered as "moral virtue." A more literal and arguably much better rendition is "character excellence" or "excellence of character." To what extent, then, is Aristotelian character excellence moral? My aim in this paper is to make progress toward answering this question. Advancing an answer evidently requires clarification of two things: the nature of Aristotelian character excellence and the nature of morality. The task of defining morality is enormous. Less so, but nonetheless a tall order, is articulating a satisfactory account of Aristotelian character excellence. So how should one proceed? I proceed in a circumscribed and imperfect way by engaging some familiar and important contributions to the following broader question: Is Aristotle's ethical theory a moral theory? I use these contributions to cast light on my narrower question and to shape it into a more manageable form. Precisely, I draw out of the works of Bernard Williams, Terence Irwin, Christine Korsgaard, and Julia Annas seven supposed conditions of morality, six positive and one negative. I then assess these conditions with respect to Aristotelian character excellence. My basic conclusion is that Aristotelian character excellence is for the most part non-moral. Instead, Aristotelian character excellence is a sort of civic category. Character excellence is required for flourishing within a citystate, more precisely, within the best kind of city-state, an aristocracy. Still more precisely, given Aristotle's non-egalitarian views about the characterological capacities of various kinds of human being and accordingly about the correct socio-political structure of the city-state, Aristotelian character excellence qua civic excellence is the excellence of the free male Greek aristocratic citizen. Part II: Character in Psychology and X-phi (7) William Fleeson (Wake Forest University) & Michael Furr (Wake Forest University): “Do Broad Character Traits Exist? When Individual Differences Matter More than the Average of People” When considering the implications of psychological research for ethical philosophy, many conclusions have been drawn on the basis of results describing averages and average people. Some of these results for the average person include that average people are more likely to help a stranger when they find a dime in a phone booth, or that average people are more likely to help a stranger when they are not in a hurry, or that average people are more likely to help a stranger when they recently smelled something pleasant. These results are striking, in that slight changes in situational characteristics appear to lead to large changes in virtuous behavior. Because situations appear to be so powerful in their average effects, it seems that traits cannot be very powerful in determining people’s actions, that broad traits of virtue either do not exist or are inconsequential, and that people are not virtuous. Although the results for the average person may matter for some conclusions, we argue that the results for the average person do not justify many of these conclusions because individual differences matter more than such averages do for many of the most important questions. In particular, two centrally important questions are “What is the nature and determining power of the character traits that exist, if any exist?” and “What are people as constituted capable of?” Individual differences matter more for the first question because the question of the nature, power, and existence of broad character traits (i.e., virtues) cannot be answered by looking at average effects; the effects for the average person do not address how much people differ from each other, how much those differences determine their behavior, nor the ways in which people differ from each other. For example, the fact that the average person helps more in a good mood than in a bad mood does not address whether people differ in how much they help or the determinative power of those differences in various helping situations. Individual differences matter more than averages for the second question because average effects reveal what people are capable of on average, but do not reveal what people are capable of in peak performance. Just as it would be incorrect to make conclusions about what people as constituted are capable of mathematically from the mathematical mistakes people make on average, it would be incorrect to make conclusions about what people as constituted are capable of ethically from the ethical mistakes people make on average. In this essay, we (1) distinguish between results describing average effects and those describing individual differences; (2) explain why we believe that individual differences are what matter for these two questions; and (3) argue that these two questions are centrally important ones. We also consider potential exception cases in which averages for people may matter more than do individual differences. We conclude that clearer understanding of individual differences would make a substantial difference in the use of empirical results for understanding character. (8) Christian Miller (Wake Forest University): “A New Approach to Character Traits in Light of Psychology” According to one position in the contemporary literature on character, every single person has all of the moral virtues, such as modesty and compassion, although to varying degrees. Versions of this idea can be found in the Big Five model which dominates personality psychology today. Yet according to another position, no one has any character traits as all since they are simply illusions and do not exist. Hence there is not one person who is honest or compassionate or courageous. Between these extremes, there are plenty of intermediate views, such as the local trait approach advocated by John Doris. However, I think that all of these positions are not supported by the available evidence coming from psychology. In this paper, I outline a novel theory of what I call ‘Mixed Traits.’ On my view, most people do not have the moral virtues, and most people also do not have the moral vices. They also do not have local virtues or vices like ‘honesty in test taking situations.’ But at the same time, most people do have robust character traits that play a central role in giving rise to morally relevant thoughts and actions. How can all these claims hang together consistently? The short answer is that these Mixed Traits are indeed causally active mental dispositions, but from a moral perspective they have both significant morally positive aspects (hence precluding them from counting as vices) alongside significant morally negative aspects (hence precluding them from counting as virtues). They can, for instance, give rise to powerful feelings of selfless empathy for the suffering of another person which leads to altruistic helping, while also disposing us to kill an innocent person in a matter of minutes under pressure from an authority figure. In order to illustrate the approach, I will focus in particular on Mixed Traits associated with harming motivation and behavior. (9) Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University) & Jesse Summers (Duke University): “Scrupulous Morality” We praise agents for their moral character, especially for paying close attention to moral requirements even in small matters. Yet some of those who pay the closest attention to moral requirements raise a problem. Patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, particularly those with ethical or religious obsessions, illustrate that a single-minded pursuit of morality is not always so clearly praiseworthy. The question is why. One attempt to distinguish praiseworthy traits from pathological obsessions—which draws from the literature on moral fetishization—is that pathological obsessions do not focus on those features of a situation that actually make the situation right or wrong, and focus instead on the value of morality or purity itself. A genuinely moral person, on the contrary, focuses on the “right-making” or “wrong-making” features of a situation. We suggest that this distinction, while useful, overlooks the importance of rationalization in the OCD patient: the OCD patient may focus on genuinely moral features of a situation, but she does so to the exclusion of all other features. However, she also greatly exaggerates the importance of her own thoughts to her moral goodness. Together, these two traits suggest that what genuinely distinguishes the moral and pathological cases is that the pathological case is characteristically motivated by an anxiety about wrongdoing that then prompts the person to pay excessive attention to putatively moral features of a situation—which are often genuinely moral features, but needn’t be—rather than taking a more direct interest in those moral features themselves. (10) Robert Hogan (Tulsa University & Hogan Assessment Systems) and Theodore Hayes (George Washington University): “The Meaning of Character” This paper analyzes the concept of character from a psychological perspective in order to make four points. Our first point is that philosophers since Aristotle tend to define character in terms of traits, and traits are the core of modern personality psychology. Traits are recurring patterns of behavior that can be observed, subjected to statistical analysis, and used to predict other peoples’ behavior. A very large body of empirical evidence suggests that trait analysis is an indispensable tool for predicting how others are likely to behave. Second, modern personality psychology defines traits as “neuro-psychic” structures that actually exist somewhere inside people, and the activities of these structures are expressed in behavior. The authors regard this version of trait theory as metaphysics, as unverifiable in principle. In contrast, we believe that “traits exist in the behavior of actors and in the eyes of the beholders”; we believe that people use trait terms: (1) to label observed consistencies in the behavior of other people; and (2) to predict the behavior of other people. Attributions about character are a special class of trait attributions. Third, we believe character attributions refer to four classes of behavior. The first, which we call “Integrity”, concerns following the accepted codes of conduct in one’s culture or profession; Wall Street Bankers who seek to avoid banking regulations appear to lack of integrity, as do spouses who cheat. The second, which we call “Humanity”, refers to behavior that reflects compassion for life’s victims; Mother Teresa or Martin Luther King often displayed this kind of behavior. The third class, which we call “Principled”, concerns behavior that reflects strict adherence to a set of core beliefs, regardless of the consequences; examples here include Christian martyrs and Al Qaeda. The final class of behavior, which we call “Endurance”, concerns enduring immense hardships in pursuit of ostensibly noble goals; the Nobel Laureates Aung San Suu Kyi and Nelson Mandela might be examples of this category of behavior. Our final point is drawn from Nietzsche: trait attributions ostensibly concern the behavior of others, but are ultimately self-serving. An individual’s character may be lauded by one group and denounced by another even when the same behaviors are in evidence. When we ascribe character to another person, what we mean is that their behavior is likely to be good for us; conversely, when we denounce another person’s character, we are describing behavior that is likely to be bad for us. Because people are, at their core, fundamentally ambivalent, we mostly approve (or disapprove) of two kinds of behavior: (a) behavior that is likely to serve our personal self-interests; and (b) behavior that is likely to serve the interests of the groups with which we identify. Character is a pragmatic attribution. (11) Robert Stolorow (Contemporary Institute for Psychoanalysis, Los Angeles): “Character and Emotional Phenomenology: Psychotherapeutic and Ethical Implications” Traditionally, in psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis, the term character has been used to refer to constellations or configurations of behavioral traits: “Anal characters” are said to be compulsive and perfectionistic; “hysterical characters” are described as histrionic; and so on. This chapter conceptualizes character from a perspective that takes worlds of emotional experiencing as its principal focus. Such organizations of emotional experiencing always take form in contexts of human interrelatedness. Developmentally, recurring patterns of emotional interaction within the child-caregiver system give rise to principles (themes, meanings, cognitive-emotional schemas) that recurrently shape subsequent emotional experiences, especially experiences of significant relationships. Such organizing principles are unconscious, not in the sense of being repressed, but in being pre-reflective. The totality of a person’s pre-reflective organizing principles constitutes his or her character. Of particular importance are those organizing principles formed in contexts of emotional trauma, relational contexts characterized by massive malattunement to significant emotional pain. Some therapeutic and ethical implications of this formulation will be explored. Part III: Character, Autonomy, and Action Explanation (12) Owen Flanagan (Duke University): “Performing Oneself and Creating One's Character” I explore the ancient idea that life is some kind of dramatic or artistic performance. How seriously and literally ought we to take this idea that life is like a dramatic performance, even that it is one? There are metaphysical and logical questions about whether and how self-creation and selfconstitution are possible, especially how it is possible to engage in the sort of self-construction that might yield what we call "character." (13) Paul Katsafanas (Boston University): “Autonomy, Character, and Self-Understanding” Autonomy, traditionally conceived, is the capacity to direct one’s actions in light of self-given principles or values. Character, traditionally conceived, is the set of unchosen, relatively rigid traits and proclivities that influence, constrain, or determine one’s actions. It’s natural to think that autonomy and character will be in tension with one another, for two reasons. First, autonomy is defined in terms of self-chosen principles, character in terms of constraints on choice. Second, when we attribute an action to an agent’s capacity for autonomy, we treat it as issuing from exercises of reflective, self-conscious choice; when we attribute it to the agent’s character, we treat it as caused by potentially unreflective motives, emotions, and dispositions. How deep does this tension run? Of course, the answer depends on which conception of autonomy and character we accept. For example, if we construe autonomy as authenticity—as acting in a way that’s true to one’s deep character—then there may be no tension whatsoever. On the other hand, if we conceive of autonomy as libertarian freedom—as the capacity to choose in a way that’s wholly undetermined by factors external to the will—then there may indeed be a conflict. So, to answer our question, we need to render it more determinate. We need to fix a conception of autonomy and ask how character comports with it. I want to work with the broadest possible account of autonomy. Thus, I’ll begin, in Section One, by discussing core components that are shared by most accounts of autonomy. I suggest that autonomy requires the capacity to engage in causally efficacious, content-restricted choices that are not determined by the motives upon which one is reflecting. Section Two briefly clarifies the notion of character. With this groundwork in place, Section Three considers the ways in which character can limit the scope of choice and influence the reasons upon which one acts. I argue that these limitations and influences present no problem for autonomy. However, Section Four articulates a different and more problematic way in which character affects choice. There, I argue that character can limit autonomy when it operates in a certain manner. As a first approximation, character limits autonomy when it influences the agent’s choice in a way that were she aware of it, (1) she would disavow the influence, and (2) the influence could no longer operate in the same way. Put a bit differently, I argue that character undermines autonomy when it generates reflectively unstable perceptions of warrant. Section Five considers the way in which the effects of character are sometimes dissolved by self-understanding. In short: I’ll argue that the mere fact that character constraints and influences choice is unproblematic. What matters is a particular kind of surreptitious influence that character can