Intermediate serial cost-sharing rules
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper we give a generalization of the serial costsharing rule de ned by Moulin and Shenker (1992) for cost sharing problems. According to the serial cost sharing rule, agents with low demands of a good pay cost increments associated with low quantities in the production process of that good. This fact might not always be desirable for those agents, since those cost increments might be higher than others, for example with concave cost functions. In this paper we give a family of cost sharing rules which allocates cost increments in all the possible places in the production process. And we characterize axiomatically each of them by means of an axiomatic characterization related to the one given for the serial cost-sharing rule by Moulin and Shenker (1994). JEL classi cation: C71
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