Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a class of games with a pure strategy being strictly dominated by another pure strategy such that the former survives along solutions of the Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics from an open set of initial conditions. JEL classification: C72
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 56 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006