Cs364b: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #2: Unit-demand Bidders and Walrasian Equilibria * 1 Bidders with Unit-demand Valuations 1.1 the Setting
نویسنده
چکیده
Last lecture we discussed two simple auction scenarios — identical items with unit-demand bidders, and non-identical items with bidders with additive valuations. In both scenarios, we gave an ascending auction that is ex post incentive compatible (EPIC) — meaning sincere bidding by every bidder is an ex post Nash equilibrium (EPNE) with guaranteed non-negative utility — and that maximizes the welfare, assuming sincere bidding (up to a discretization error). This lecture introduces a third scenario, which generalizes the first (and is incomparable to the second).
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