After Kyoto: a Global Scramble for Advantage

T he 1997 Kyoto Protocol is generally viewed as having set carbon emission reduction goals for the developed world for the purpose of avoiding global warming, a tragedy of the commons. 1 But instead of avoiding the plaguing free-rider problem that works in favor of tragedy, the protocol allows uncontrolled growth in carbon emissions from the developing world, which will more than offset reductions elsewhere. Strictly speaking, the Kyoto Protocol is not about avoiding a tragedy of the commons. It involves much more than that. Apart from expectations that meeting the terms of the protocol will not reduce future emissions, the scientific basis for Kyoto's massive and costly undertaking is far from settled (Singer 1999). Competing models that seek to link human behavior to climate change yield mixed results, which is to say that temperature changes may be caused by solar activity, clouds, or ocean temperature changes. There is also contradictory evidence on temperature change itself. It is not a foregone conclusion that temperatures , though increasing in the last few years, are rising systematically. Nor is it clear that human activity contributes to the current temperature increases. Putting the scientific questions to one side and viewing the protocol on its own terms, there is serious question whether it is primarily about carbon emission reductions and global warming or about something else. An analysis of the agreement and of the post-Kyoto strategizing suggests that control of global warming is largely symbolic, which does not gainsay its vital importance to environmental groups. The real effects of the protocol relate to cartelization and efforts by interest groups and