Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts
نویسنده
چکیده
The Value is a solution concept originally due to Shapley (1953). The idea behind the concept is to evaluate how much will a player be willing to pay to participate in a given game. It seeks to represent what the game is worth for a player. In some sense the value captures the expected outcome of the game. We will start with the TU (transferable utility) framework and the axiomatic approach and then consider various extensions to the NTU (non transferable utility) case.
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