Employment and Financial Stability: Dual Goals of Capital Flow Management∗ (Job Market Paper)

I study optimal capital flow management in a small open-economy DSGE model with two frictions: downward nominal wage rigidity and a pricedependent collateral constraint. Wage rigidity introduces an aggregate demand externality under fixed exchange rates and the collateral constraint introduces a pecuniary externality. I provide an analytical characterization of the optimal capital flow management measures and show how they mitigate the externalities. Specifically, I find that the optimal policy in this economy is a prudential tax that discourages capital inflows when the risk of financial crisis is high or when wage is increasing, and it is a stimulative subsidy that encourages capital inflows when unemployment is high and the risk of financial crisis is low. Using quantitative methods and standard calibration, I show that the optimal state-contingent capital inflow tax and even a non-state-contingent flat tax can significantly reduce unemployment and prevent financial crises, hence ultimately improving welfare. These results are of particular relevance for members of a currency union or emerging economies with an exchange rate peg. JEL codes: E2, F32, F4, H21