Measurement on the Complexity Entropy of Dynamic Game Models for Innovative Enterprises under Two Kinds of Government Subsidies

Abstract: In this paper, setting the high-tech industry as the background, we build a dynamic duopoly game model in two cases with different government subsidies based on the innovation inputs and outputs, respectively. We analyze the equilibrium solution and stability conditions of the system, and study the dynamic evolution of the system under the conditions of different system parameters by the numerical simulation method. The simulation results show that both innovation subsidy policies have positive effects on firms’ innovation activities. Besides, improving the level of innovation can encourage firms to innovate. It also shows that an exaggerated adjusting speed of innovation outputs may cause complicated dynamic phenomena such as bifurcation and chaos, which means that the system has relatively higher entropy than that in a stable state. The degree of the government innovation subsidies is also shown to impact the stability and entropy of the system.