The Coalition of the Willing: Effect of Country Diversity in an Environmental Treaty Game
نویسنده
چکیده
It is analyzed how size differences among countries affect the benefits from climate coalitions. It is shown that size differences lead to smaller coalitions and greater benefits than coalitions among identical countries. This approach is applied to the world’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide with each country valuing emission reductions according to (i) its share in world emissions, (ii) its share in world GDP, and (iii) its share of world population. The most realistic outcome is obtained in case (ii), with the EU leading in a climate coalition, with the US and Japan joining but no others, while in case (i) the US would lead, with others successively joining the higher the abatement cost, and in case (iii) only China would abate. The importance of the discount rate for dynamic stability is also considered.
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