Imitation, patent protection and welfare

نویسندگان

  • Arijit Mukherjee
  • Enrico Pennings
چکیده

Once a new technology has been invented, there is a credible threat of imitation when patent protection is strong and imitation cost is low. Within the area of credible imitation, the innovator has an incentive to postpone technology adoption when the cost of imitation is relatively high. The possibility of licensing, however, eliminates or at least reduces the incentive for delayed technology adoption and may increase or decrease social welfare. Further, this paper explains the possibility of a forward contract on licensing.

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منابع مشابه

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تاریخ انتشار 2001