Moral Hazard in IT Project Completion. A Multiple Case Study Analysis
نویسنده
چکیده
Implementing management support information systems with the use of outsourcing is the prevalent method of completing this type of project in Poland. Agency theory is one of the significant categories of theories used in the analysis of IT outsourcing. Literature studies indicate a research gap concerning the phenomenon of moral hazard in IT projects consisting in the implementation of management support information systems. The scope of this article is to present research results on the phenomenon of moral hazard based on the case study method. The research results may be interesting for theoreticians of business informatics and for practitioners completing IT projects both in enterprises and government agencies.
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